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Abstract
Cooperative behavior that increases the fitness of others at a cost to oneself can be promoted by natural selection only in
the presence of an additional mechanism. One such mechanism is based on population structure, which can lead to
clustering of cooperating agents. Recently, the focus has turned to complex dynamical population structures such as social
networks, where the nodes represent individuals and links represent social relationships. We investigate how the dynamics
of a social network can change the level of cooperation in the network. Individuals either update their strategies by
imitating their partners or adjust their social ties. For the dynamics of the network structure, a random link is selected and
breaks with a probability determined by the adjacent individuals. Once it is broken, a new one is established. This linking
dynamics can be conveniently characterized by a Markov chain in the configuration space of an ever-changing network of
interacting agents. Our model can be analytically solved provided the dynamics of links proceeds much faster than the
dynamics of strategies. This leads to a simple rule for the evolution of cooperation: The more fragile links between
cooperating players and non-cooperating players are (or the more robust links between cooperators are), the more likely
cooperation prevails. Our approach may pave the way for analytically investigating coevolution of strategy and structure.
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Introduction
Cooperation is ubiquitous in the real world ranging from genes
to multicellular organisms [1–4]. Most importantly, human society
is based upon cooperation. However this cooperative behavior
apparently contradicts natural selection [5]: Selfish behavior will
be rewarded during competition between individuals, because
selfish individuals enjoy the benefits from the cooperation of
others, but avoid the associated costs. Therefore, the puzzle how
natural selection can lead to cooperation has fascinated evolu-
tionary biologists since Darwin.
Evolutionary game theory is an intuitive and convenient
framework to study this puzzle. As a metaphor, the Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD) has been widely used to investigate the origin of
cooperation. In this game, two players simultaneously decide
whether to cooperate (C) or to defect(D). They both receive R upon
mutual cooperation and P upon mutual defection. A defector
exploiting a cooperator receives T, and the exploited cooperator
gets S. This can be formalized in the form of a payoff matrix,
CD
C
D
RS
TP
  
: ð1Þ
The PD is characterized by the payoff ranking TwRwPwS. For
repeated games, the additional requirement 2RwTzS ensures
that alternating between strategies is less lucrative than repeated
mutual cooperation. In the one shot PD, it is best for a rational
individual never to cooperate irrespective of the co-player’s
decision. Thus, defection is the Nash Equilibrium [6]. However,
the two players would be better off if they both cooperated, hence
the dilemma. In an evolutionary setting, where payoff determines
reproductive fitness, defectors can reproduce faster based on their
higher payoff and cooperation diminishes- defection is evolutionary
stable [7,8]. Several mechanisms have been proposed to explain the
persistence of cooperative behavior, including kin selection [9],
direct [10,11] and indirect reciprocity [12,13], group selection
[14,15]as well as the networkreciprocity[16–24]. Furthermore, the
relationship between these mechanisms receives an increasing
attention [25–28].
Both in animal and human societies, individuals interact with a
limited number of individuals. The interactions of individuals are
often captured based on the network of contacts. Therefore, there
has been an increasing interest in the influence of population
structure on the evolution of cooperation.
Nowak and May first studied the PD game on regular lattices
[16]. Subsequently, social dilemmas on regular graphs have been
investigated [19–21,29]. Many authors have also considered more
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[17,18,24]. It has been well recognized that network topologies
can play a crucial role in the evolution of cooperation, in addition
to the payoff matrix and the update mechanism.
The network topology is assumed to be static in the above work.
However, social relationships between individuals are not eternal,
but are continuously changing in the real world. Therefore, the
coevolution of strategy and network receives increasing attention
[30–47].
Dynamical networks can significantly boost cooperation com-
pared to static networks. On the one hand, cooperation thrives if
individuals are able to promptly adjust their social ties, because
this allows cooperators to escape from defectors [38]. Similarly,
cooperation is more likely to occur if the favored relationships
between cooperators (CC links) tend to be less fragile than adverse
social ties (CD links) [37,43]. The latter result is consistent with our
empirical intuitions and is widely observed in the real world.
However, most of the works on this issue are investigated only by
numerical methods and not by analytical approaches. This is
mainly because it is difficult to describe the coevolution of strategy
and structure of a network analytically.
Pacheco et al. approximate their linking dynamics by ordinary
differential equations [39–41,43]. They found that fast linking
dynamics leads to a transformation of the payoff matrix, such that
e.g. cooperation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma can be stabilized. This
approach does not keep the total number of links constant.
Moreover, the analytical approach does not take stochastic effects
into account.
Here, we consider a linking dynamics described by a discrete
stochastic model. The evolution of links can be described as a
Markov chain, which is the starting point for our analytical
considerations. We specify the conditions required for the payoff
matrix to make cooperation stable. A simple rule is obtained when
the linking dynamics proceeds sufficiently fast, which reveals
quantitatively how the link breaking probabilities have to be
chosen such that cooperation may gain a foothold. Furthermore,
we show how our stochastic linking dynamics also results in a
transformation of the payoff matrix as in [39].
Analysis
We consider the coevolution of strategy and structure in the PD
game. Each player’s strategy s can either be cooperation (C) or
defection (D), denoted by (1,0)
T and (0,1)
T, respectively. Initially,
the whole population of size N are situated on vertices of a regular
graph with degree L, where nodes indicate individuals while edges
denote the pairwise partnerships between individuals. We consider
the case where the total number of agents N is much larger than
the average degree L. The payoff of each individual is obtained by
playing the PD game with all of its immediate neighbors:
Pi~
X
j[Ni
sT
i Msj ð2Þ
where Ni represents the neighborhood set of player i and M is the
payoff matrix. Instead of the general matrix of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma Eq. (1) with four parameters, we consider a simpler
payoff matrix,
M~
10
1zuu
  
ð3Þ
where the parameter u, measuring how profitable unilateral
defection is, ranges from zero to one. Note that this payoff matrix
recovers the payoff ranking described above, TwRwPwS.
We emphasize that Eq.(3) describes a special case of general PD
games, but it is widely used in biology and sociology [1].
In each time step, an agent has the opportunity to change its
strategy with probability w. With probability 1{w, a link in the
network can be changed. For w~0, no strategy update takes
place, hence the cooperation level stays unchanged and only the
dynamical organization of cooperators and defectors can be
observed [45]. For w~1, this model degenerates to a PD game on
a static regular graph, which has been studied in great detail
[16,19,22,29,48].
Let us first consider the dynamics of links (which occurs with
probability 1{w). In each rewiring step, a link XY is selected
from the network at random (XY~CC,CD or DD). The link
remains intact with probability 1{kXY. With probability kXY, the
link is broken. In this case, one of the two adjacent players is
picked at random and switches to a random player who is not its
immediate neighbor in the population (see Fig. (1)). In this way,
link XY is broken and a new link XZ or YZ is introduced.
We consider the case of 0vkXYv1. In this case, linking
dynamics does not assume rationality of agents: Adverse CD links
may be kept and advantageous CC links may sometimes be
broken.
In contrast with previous analytical work focusing on a
dynamical number of links [39], here the total number of links
LN=2 is constant in the evolution process as in [33,38]. This
constraint can imply a limited resource and avoids that all
individuals are linked to all others (for generic parameter choices).
In the beginning, each link is assigned a name j, where
(j~1,2   ,LN=2). In each time step, we choose a link it~i at
random, where the superscript denotes the time. If the selected
link it does not break, we have itz1~it. If the link breaks, a new
social tie is introduced, denoted as itz1. We denote the type of link
it by T(it), where T(it) can be CC, CD or DD. Herein, we
investigate how T(it) changes with time t.
The dynamics of T(it) can be captured by a Markov chain with
transition matrix Q(XY)(ZW), which is the probability that an XY
Figure 1. Linking dynamics. If the dashed link is selected in the
topological evolution, it will be broken off with probability kCD. If the
dashed link is broken, then either A or B is selected to establish a new
link. If A is chosen, then he switches to a random individual of the
population who is not his current neighbors (B, D, E, F, G or J).
Otherwise, B is chosen, then he also switches to a random individual of
the population who is not his current neighbors (A, F, G, H, I or J).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011187.g001
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linking dynamics, the probability of moving between CC and DD
is zero. So, we only have to calculate Q(XY)(XW) or Q(XY)(ZY).
For instance, Q(CC)(CC) is the probability that it of type CC
transforms to itz1 of type CC. This occurs in the following cases:
(1) When it is not selected in the linking dynamics (with
probability (LN{2)=(LN));
(2) When it is selected (with probability 2=(LN)), this happens
either when the original CC link is not broken off (with
probability 1{kCC) or when the selected player of the original
link switches to another cooperator provided the link is broken
(with probability kCCxC where xC is the frequency of
cooperators). Hence,
Q(CC)(CC)~
LN{2
LN
z
2
LN
(1{kCC)zkCCxC ðÞ ð 4Þ
Similar considerations for other links lead to the transition
probability matrix
Q~
LN{2
LN
I3z
2
LN
V, ð5Þ
where I3 is the identity matrix and the matrix V is given by
CC CD DD
V~
CC
CD
DD
kCCxCz(1{kCC) kCCxD 0
kCDxC=21 {(kCD=2) kCDxD=2
0 kDDxC kDDxDz(1{kDD)
0
B B @
1
C C A
ð6Þ
and xD~1{xC is the frequency of defectors. We emphasize
that the transition matrix is only an approximation, because it
does not exclude the case that a player establishes a second
link with one of its immediate neighbors. However, the
approximation is very good when the degree of all links is
much smaller than the population size.
Note that this Markov chain is irreducible and aperiodic when
kCCkCDkDDxC=0, hence there exists a unique stationary
distribution w~(wCC,wCD,wDD) determined by equation wQ~w
[49]. We find that
w~N(xC)1 ,
2kCCxD
kCDxC
,
kCCx2
D
kDDx2
C
  
ð7Þ
where N(xC)~(1z(2kCCxD=kCDxC)z(kCCx2
D=kDDx2
C))
{1 is a
normalization factor. Here, wXY represents the probability that a
link it is of type XY in the stationary regime. Therefore, the
average number of XY links NXY is given by:
E(NXY)~
LN
2
wXY: ð8Þ
Thus, wXY also represents the average fraction of XY links in the
whole population in the stationary regime of the linking dynamics.
Let us now consider the dynamics of strategies (which occurs
with probability w). A player i with strategy si is selected at
random, subsequently player j with strategy sj is randomly selected
among i’s current neighbors. Player i compares the payoff with
that of player j and takes strategy sj with probability [48,50]
1
1zexp½b(Pi{Pj) 
ð9Þ
where Pi and Pj are the accumulated payoffs for i and j,
respectively. The parameter b denotes the intensity of selection.
For b%1, selection is weak and strategy changes are almost
random. For b??, selection is strong and strategies of more
successful agents are always adopted, whereas less successful agents
are never imitated. In large, well mixed populations the dynamics
can be approximated by [51]
_ x xC~xC(1{xC)tanh b
fC{fD
2
  
z
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
xC(1{xC)
N
r
j, ð10Þ
where j is the Gaussian white noise with variance 1, fC and fD
denote the average fitness of a cooperator and a defector,
respectively. For large population size N, the stochastic term
vanishes [51] and we obtain
_ x xC~xC(1{xC)tanh b
fC{fD
2
  
: ð11Þ
Note that this equation has the same equilibrium properties as the
usual replicator dynamics [8]
_ x xC~xC(1{xC)(fC{fD): ð12Þ
If w is sufficiently small, the structure of the system is close to the
stationary state when strategies change. In this case, the stationary
distribution of linking dynamics determines the average fitness of
individuals [39]. Then, we can employ the strategy dynamics from
well mixed populations for our structured system. The average
payoff of cooperators is given by
fC~2E(NCC)=(NxC)~LwCC=xC ð13Þ
The average payoff of defectors is
fD~((1zu)E(NCD)z2uE(NDD))=(NxD)
~L((1zu)wCDz2uwDD)=2xD
ð14Þ
Equating fC and fD or, equivalently, substituting them into Eq.
(12), we find that an unstable equilibrium x 
C [ (0,1) emerges when
uv(kCD{kCC)=kCC: ð15Þ
It is located at
x 
C~
kCCkCDu
kCDkDD{kCCkDD(1zu)zkCCkCDu
ð16Þ
Thiscritical value x 
C determines the attractionbasin of cooperation
(x 
C,1 : Cooperators take over when their initial frequency xC(0) is
larger than this critical value, whereas defectors take over when
xC(0) is less than this critical value. In other words, the evolutionary
PD game withlinking dynamicsis similar to that of the coordination
game in well mixed population where both cooperation and
defection are best replies to themselves.
Stochastic Linking
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game under linking dynamics. Substituting Eqs. (13)(14) into Eq.
(12) yields
_ x xC~N(xC)
LxD
kCDkDDxC
(f
0
C{f
0
D), ð17Þ
where the first factors are always positive and f
0
C~kCDkDDxC and
f
0
D~(1zu)kCCkDDxCzukCCkCDxD are the payoffs of coopera-
tors and defectors in a modified game with payoff matrix
M
0
~
kCDkDD 0
kCCkDD(1zu) kCCkCDu
  
: ð18Þ
In other words, the coevolution of strategy and structure
transforms the original PD game into another one. In particular,
M
0
turns to a coordination game when M
0
11wM
0
21, i.e.,
uv(kCD{kCC)=kCC. Thus, the PD game with linking dynamics
corresponds to a coordination game in a well mixed population
[39,40]. Cooperation is stable only when
uvr, ð19Þ
where r~(kCD{kCC)=kCC.
The quantity r measures the propensity for cooperators to form
clusters that supports cooperation [16]. Indeed, remembering that
kXY indicates the probability with which an XY link breaks,
(kCD=kCC)~rz1 characterizes the fragility ratio between CD
and CC link. In particular, CD link are more fragile than CC links
if r exceeds zero. In other words, a cooperator is more likely to
play with cooperators than defectors and to sustain the social
relationship when r is greater than zero. Therefore r also illustrates
how likely a cooperator is to interact with a cooperator. The
greater r, the more likely it is for cooperators to form clusters.
Increasing r allows cooperators to spread more effectively and
can allow them to invade from initially small clusters [52]. The
quantity r characterizes the propensity of cooperators to form
clusters. Cooperation gains a foothold when r is sufficiently large.
Precisely, r is sufficiently large when uvr by Eq. (19). In this case,
cooperator clusters expand and take over the whole population.
We have explained intuitively how r enhances cooperation level.
In addition, we can also show analytically that large r leads to
cooperation by enlarging the cooperation attraction basin:
Substituting kCD~(rz1)kCC to Eq. (16), we obtain:
x 
C(r)~
kCCu(1zr)
((kCC{kCD)uz(kCCuzkDD)r)
ð20Þ
The quantity
d
dr
x 
C(r)~{kCCkDDu(1zu)=((kCC{kCD)uz
(kCCuzkDD)r)
2 is always negative for all permitted parameters.
Hence, x 
C(r) is a decreasing function of r. Since (x 
C,1  is the
attraction basin of cooperation. Accordingly, increasing r enlarges
the attraction basin of cooperation. In other words, it requires
fewer cooperators to take over the whole population with larger r.
So far, it has been shown that the simple rule gives us an insight
on how cooperation comes into being with linking dynamics.
Furthermore, it can also be revealed that CC links should be less
fragile [39] while CD ones should be easy to break in order to
promote cooperation. Since r~kCD=kCC{1, the larger kCD or
the smaller kCC, the greater r is. Thus cooperation is promoted
when the probability to break CD links kCD is large or the
probability to break CC links kCC is small. This is in line with
previous numerical consideration [37,38]. However, r is indepen-
dent of kDD. Does this mean that kDD has no impact on
cooperation? In fact, it is not the case. On the contrary, kDD plays
an important role in promoting cooperation when uvr holds.
Actually, this simple rule only guarantees that the equilibrium x 
C
of Eq. (16) lies between zero and one, where it is defined. However
it is not sufficient to make cooperation advantageous. Besides, the
initial frequency of cooperators should lie in the attraction basin of
cooperation (x 
C,1  to make cooperators gain a foothold in the
population. Nevertheless, notice that Eq. (16) can be rewritten as:
x 
C(kDD)~
kCCkCDu
kDD(kCD{kCC(1zu))zkCCkCDu
ð21Þ
hence, x 
C is a decreasing function of kDD provided
kCD{kCC(1zu)w0, i.e. the simple rule holds. In this way,
increasing kDD augments the attraction basin of cooperation
(x 
C,1  (See Fig. (2)). Thus it is easier for cooperators to gain a
foothold when kDD is larger.
In Fig. (3), we show that the simulation results are in agreement
with our analytical predictions when the selection pressure is high,
while the simulations deviate from the analytical results when the
selection pressure is low. For strong selection, we find above the
line kCC~(1=(1zu))kCD, the cooperation level is low, which is
consistent with our theoretical predictions. For weak selection,
however, the cooperation level is almost 100% for the parameter
region closely above the line for kCC between 0 and 0:6, where the
cooperation level should be low based on our the simple rule.
These deviations are due to both the finite population effect and
the approximation of linking dynamics by Eq. (5). On the one
Figure 2. Final fraction of cooperators as a function of initial
fraction of cooperators. The symbols indicate the simulation while
the arrows represent the analytical results. Both simulation and the
analytical results show that fewer cooperators can invade a population
of defectors when the DD ties are more fragile, which validates the
analytical prediction. w~0:01, b~10:0, u~0:5, kCC~0:35, kCD~0:6,
L~4 and N~100 for all the three lines in the plot. In addition, each
data point for all the plots from Fig. (2) to Fig. (6) is averaged over 30
independent runs. And in each run, we set the mean value over time
window of 103 generations to be the final fraction of cooperators, after
a transient time of 106 generations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011187.g002
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approximation based on the global frequency of cooperators, while
they are also influenced by local frequencies in the simulations. On
the other hand, we use the replicator equation to describe the
strategy evolution. But the replicator equation is only an
approximation of the strategy evolution when the population size
is sufficiently large, which implies that small fitness differences can
influence the dynamics. This explains why our theoretical
predictions are less accurate for weak selection. Therefore, we
focus on strong selection in the following.
We first investigate how u affects the evolution of cooperation.
For each plot in Fig. (4), above the line kCC~(1=(1zu))kCD,
there is nearly no cooperation, while below the line, cooperation is
possible. This is consistent with our simple rule. Furthermore,
compared with the three plots in Fig. (4), we observe a decrease of
the parameter region to sustain the cooperation when u increases.
It indicates that only a small temptation to defect can sustain
cooperation.
Let us further examine the role of kDD in the evolution of
cooperation by simulation. It is observed clearly in Fig. (5) that the
more fragile DD ties are, the easier it is for cooperators to wipe out
defectors. Intuitively, for greater kDD, DD links are more likely to
break and defectors are no longer trapped in their fruitless
interactions and can instead seek new cooperators to exploit.
Thus, it seems less likely to promote cooperation for large kDD.
However, both analytical and simulation results show that high
kDD promotes cooperation (See Eq. (21) and Fig. (2)). This is
counter-intuitive. In fact, in this case, the quick partner-switching
Figure 3. Results for the final fraction of cooperators for different selection pressure b. It shows how the selection pressure affects the
analytical prediction. The black line is our analytical condition kCC~(1=(1zu))kCD. Initially, all the individuals are situated on a regular graph of
degree L~4 and size N~100. Each individual is assigned to be a cooperator or a defector with the same probability. All plots from Fig. (3) to Fig. (6)
share the same color code and initial condition. Analytical results predict that higher cooperation level can emerge only below the black line.
Simulation results show that the analytical result is more accurate for strong selection than weak selection as expected. The error is induced by the
finite population size effect. (other parameters w~0:01, u~0:3, and kDD~0:7).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011187.g003
Figure 4. Results for the final fraction of cooperators for different values of the payoff parameter u. The slope of the critical line is
increasing when u is decreasing, indicating that cooperators are more likely to emerge when the parameter u is small. (w~0:01, b~10 and kDD~0:7.)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011187.g004
Stochastic Linking
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which results in cooperation. Similar results have been reported in
[43].
Finally, we turn to investigate the role of w on the coevolution.
Fig. (6) shows that for small w, the result is in good agreement with
the theoretical prediction, while deviates from the simple rule for
large w, as expected. Similar results have been reported in the
analytical approach of Pacheco et al. [39]. Both analytical
approaches are based on the time scale separation, i.e., all the
links are almost in the stationary states when the strategy update
occurs.
Results and Discussion
To sum up, we have established a discrete model to describe the
stochastic linking dynamics analytically in terms of a Markov
chain. Based on this linking dynamics, we have studied the
coevolution of strategy and network structure. A simple condition
for the evolution of cooperation is obtained analytically that
becomes more accurate when selection is stronger. The rule shows
that the less fragile CC links are, the easier cooperation emerges.
The more fragile CD links are, the easier cooperation prevails.
Compared to Pacheco et al.’s work, time scales separation also
plays an important part in our analysis. In Pacheco et al.’s work,
time separation is used to ensure that the linking dynamics is in the
stationary regime when the strategy evolution happens. But in
contrast to Pacheco et al.’s work, our analytical approach explicitly
considers stochastic effects in the linking dynamics. Further, when
the population size is sufficiently large, this Markov chain
describing the linking dynamics can be approximated by a
different system of differential equations. Since the total number of
links is constant in our approach, there are only two independent
Figure 5. Results for the final fraction of cooperators for different values of kDD. It shows that quick partner switching between defectors,
i.e., high kDD, promotes cooperation. (w~0:01, b~10 and u~0:3.)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011187.g005
Figure 6. Results for the final fraction of cooperators for different values of w. Our analytical results are only valid under time scale
separation, as shown in this plot. (u~0:9, b~10 and kDD~0:7)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011187.g006
Stochastic Linking
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method, however, all the three variables are independent. In
general, both methods lead to very similar qualitative results.
Regarding the coevolution of strategy and network, previous
numerical work with constant number of links has assumed that
dissatisfied ties are more likely to break off than satisfied ones. In
this case, cooperation is more likely to be sustained. However, it
has not been shown analytically that to what extent satisfied links
are more stable than adverse ones to make cooperation gain a
foothold. The simple rule uv(kCD{kCC)=kCC reveals such a
relation between the payoff matrix and the parameters of the
linking dynamics. It shows under which conditions cooperation
may prevail, provided the linking dynamics is sufficiently fast.
Furthermore, we have provided a series of numerical results to
validate the analytical results. We find that numerical results are in
agreement with the analytical results for strong selection, yet may
deviate from the analytical results for weak selection.
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